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Abstract
In recent times, rapid advances in the eld of information technology have enabled rms selling
information products (for example, in the form of a CD) to provide subscription services using
remote servers. Making the product vs. service decision involves a trade-o¤. Online subscription
o¤erings are perceived to be of lower quality because of data security and network reliability issues
but can reduce or even eliminate the credible commitment (of prices) problem typically faced by
rms selling durable products. We model an innite horizon game between two symmetric rms
that choose the design architecture i.e. product or service (and consequent contracting scheme:
selling or subscription) and then set prices to optimize prots. The perceived quality loss enables
rms to di¤erentiate based on design architecture/contracting scheme and make positive prots.
Further, the rm that sells a product makes higher prot than the rm that o¤ers a subscription
service. However, as the discount factor increases, the presence of a seller leads to a credible com-
mitment problem for both rms leading to a reduction in prices. The results o¤er an explanation
for the persistence of rms selling products rather than services. Further, a rm o¤ering a subscrip-
tion service may be subject to price pressure due to the price commitment issues of a competing
seller. We also extend our insights to other settings: one involving asymmetric rms and the other
involving di¤erent discount rates for product quality and producer / consumer surplus.
Keywords: pricing; competitive strategy; forward-looking customers; online subscription services;
1 Introduction
Renting and leasing of goods and services is widely prevalent in the business world. It can be
observed across many industries: real estate, cars, machinery, books etc. There are many pros and
cons of renting and these vary from product to product. As a result, the rental model is more
prevalent in the case of some product categories as opposed to others. Broadly, renting turns out
to be useful under the following conditions: 1) The customer cannot make the large payments
associated with buying and would rather pay a smaller per period price. To some extent, this
problem can be ameliorated in situations where appropriate nancing schemes are available. 2)
The customer requires exibility of use and needs the product only over a limited time horizon.
For example, renting a car when on a trip to a new city or renting a house for a few months. 3)
The customer does not have adequate information about the quality of the product or his needs
and would like to try the product for a limited duration before making a purchase decision. 4) The
customer anticipates declining selling prices and consequently does not buy a product when it is
rst introduced. The customer then rents till the point of purchase. This last characteristic may not
be the driving force behind renting in product categories such as automobiles but is of particular
relevance in the context of information goods. In this paper, we focus on this last characteristic of
rental models in the context of the information goods industry.
In recent times, information goods that were once sold as products can now be o¤ered in the form
of subscription services. The services range from the delivery of software-as-a-service to online
gaming and also include information services such as newspapers and industrial databases. This
transition to subscription services has been enabled by signicant recent advances in information
and communication technologies. In this context, customers may prefer renting for another reason:
information goods such as software are frequently upgraded and a rental contract typically allows
for free upgrades. Customers who would not like to incur huge upgrade transition costs would then
rent rather than buy. In this paper, we do not consider upgrades though other researchers have
looked at this issue. For example, Bala and Carr(2009) evaluate the impact of customer upgrade
costs on the rms upgrade pricing policy. Sankaranarayanan(2007) analyzes Microsofts insurance
policy that protects against frequent upgrades.
Many information goods are development-intensive, a term dened by Krishnan and Zhu (2006). A
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rm that produces these information goods incurs an upfront xed cost of developing the product
that depends on the quality level of the product but incurs negligible marginal costs per copy of
product sold (any installation costs are assumed to be passed on to the users). Unlike many other
durable goods such as automobiles, information goods typically do not physically deteriorate, yet
may have much less value in the future than the present (newspapers, for example). Transaction
costs of renting could be signicant for a rm o¤ering certain kinds of durable goods. This typ-
ically involves the administrative cost that goes into managing the rental service. In fact, in the
automobile industry, this function is signicant enough to be completely taken over by third party
rental agencies such as Hertz and Enterprise. Such transaction costs are low for information goods,
unless the rm o¤ers non-linear pricing schemes. O¤ering non-linear pricing schemes may involve
a cost of monitoring usage, which may be signicant when compared to the low variable costs of
production (Sundararajan, 2004). For a treatment of a competitive setting where rms o¤er usage-
based pricing, we refer the readers to Bala & Carr (2006). In the current paper, we assume that
the rms o¤er only xed prices but may di¤er in the length of their contracts. In particular, we
assume that selling a product is a contract of innite length (or at least till the end of the horizon
under consideration) while o¤ering a subscription service terminates the contract at the end of a
time period.
The industrial motivation for the specic problem addressed here is visible in the CRM (customer
relationship management) software world. The largest CRM software vendor in the world is Siebel
(now acquired by Oracle). It is widely regarded as the dominant player in the industry despite
the entry of ERP (enterprise resource planning) vendors such as SAP. These ERP vendors hope
to create their own CRM systems and retrot their current ERP systems with this new o¤ering.
Yet, Siebel is the only large rm with specic core competence in this area. In the year 2000,
Salesforce.com entered this market with a mission to deliver account management, sales pipeline,
and CRM software via the web. The company promotes its unique selling point as low installation
costs and a low per month charge per customer. This is low compared to the large installation cost
for Siebel and signicantly higher one time per customer fee. As a result, Salesforce.com is doing
well in a market niche, small to medium sized companies. Further, Siebel has long grappled with
the idea of o¤ering its own subscription service, and in fact it does o¤er one currently. This paper
seeks to model situations such as these with the aim to provide insights into the nature of prices
and market segments across time in the competitive market for such products and services.
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From the customers perspective, using an online subscription service reduces the installation costs
and consequently the price paid, but increases the level of vulnerability of the service due to network
disruptions and poor data security1. We model this by incorporating a perceived quality loss for
a product that is o¤ered as an online subscription service as opposed to one that is sold outright.
Thus, if a monopoly rm has the choice to either sell a product or o¤er a subscription service, Coase
conjecture might apply but subscription may not always dominate selling due to perceived quality
loss. We can easily verify this using our model setup. The objective of this paper is to evaluate
a situation where symmetric rms pick their design architecture and hence consequent contracting
strategies and then compete in the market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 looks at the related literature in this area.
Section 3 elaborates on the setup of the base model and the equilibrium results. Section 4 provides
a numerical analysis of these results. Section 5 present a couple of extensions to the base model.
Section 6 concludes the analysis and discusses directions for future research. Throughout the paper,
we use the terms renting, leasing and subscription interchangeably and this should be clear from
the context.
2 Related Literature
The earliest work on the economic benets of renting / leasing is by Engelbourg(1966) who conducts
an empirical study to determine conditions under which leasing is prominent and nds that leasing
is widely used in industries where stability of income, price discrimination and market power are
important issues. Flath(1980) constructs an analytical model and concludes that the ubiquity of
leasing is due to the fact that it economizes upon the costs of detecting, assuring, and maintaining
quality, costs of search, and costs of risk bearing. Miller and Upton (1976) analyze the risk and tax
related motivation for leasing.
The renting/leasing decision also relates to the realm of the durable goods monopolist literature in
economics, primarily as a tool to price discriminate appropriately. The earliest work in this area is
by Coase(1972) who postulates that a monopolist selling a durable good to rational consumers can-
1www.howstu¤works.com/asp.htm
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not capture monopoly prots. Consumers will look ahead, anticipate a decreasing price trajectory
and hence postpone their purchase till price equals marginal cost. Stokey(1981) models this process
over an innite horizon for a non-depreciating durable good and conrms the results. Bulow(1982)
uses a two-period model with a second hand market for a durable good and shows that while a
monopolist renter can capture monopoly prots in each time period, a monopolist seller produces
goods less durable then either competitive rms or monopolist renters. However, DeGraba(1994)
modies a key assumption in Bulow(1982) to show that it is impossible to come up with a lease
short enough to completely solve the time inconsistency problem as postulated by Coase.
While the literature seems rm that pure renting dominates pure selling, it is less clear on the
subject of concurrent renting and selling. While the Coase conjecture seems to hold for the case
of complete information, price trajectories are a¤ected by consumer and producer experiences.
Consumers have expectations about future prices and product quality and these estimates could
be incorrect. This topic is analyzed by Shapiro(1983) for di¤erent cases in order to obtain optimal
price paths. Producers are a¤ected by the learning curve which in turn a¤ects production costs.
This was rst studied by Stokey(1979) who found that decreasing production costs could support
a decreasing price trajectory. Balachander and Srinivasan(1988) extend this to the case where
consumers have expectations for both prices and the level of experiential learning for the producer.
A conclusion that we derive from this is that while leasing dominates selling in the case of complete
information, this need not be the case when consumers cannot evaluate product quality beforehand.
Bucovetsky and Chilton(1986) analyze concurrent renting and selling in a durable goods monopoly
under the threat of entry and nd that there is an optimal preentry mix. Desai and Purohit(1998)
nd that di¤erent combinations of leasing and selling are possible depending on the rates at which
leased and sold goods depreciate. They base their model on the market for new and used cars.
As evidenced by the past literature, one of the major objectives pursued by researchers after the
initial results on durable goods markets has been to test major results such as the Coase conjecture
in specic industry and market settings. Each industry and market setting brings with it a unique
set of assumptions that deviate from the baseline assumptions of the earlier models. Balachander
and Srinivasan(1988) and Desai and Purohit(1998) are examples of such work. Research e¤orts
have also gone into analyzing the lease/sell decision in the context of competition. Bucovetsky and
Chilton(1986) and Desai and Purohit(1999) are examples of such work. Along similar lines, our
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work has a dual objective. It considers the information goods industry, particularly that part of
the industry where products can now be o¤ered as online subscription services using the current
state of information technology, and models business outcomes for this industry in the context of
competition.
The economics of online services di¤ers from other durable products in many ways. First, the
marginal costs of production are negligible, but there might be a signicant xed cost of developing
the product. Second, although there is no physical depreciation of these services, they do depreciate
in value in a way similar to other products. Third, the high rate of innovation in the information
goods sector also ensures that there are no major used goods markets. This phenomenon is further
accentuated for some service categories such as software services in which there might be strict
licensing requirements. Finally, as mentioned before, o¤ering an information good as an online
service might cause a loss in service quality due to issues related to data security and network
reliability. Our paper incorporates these key elements of information goods in a competitive model.
We specify circumstances under which rms might be better o¤ using traditional selling models as
opposed to subscription services. Thus, this paper also adds to the literature on the economics of
durable goods by testing the generalizability of the Coase conjecture to a competitive setting.
3 The Base Model
We model all cases in the paper as sequential decision processes with the producers and consumers
making rational decisions at each stage. We also assume complete information; that is the con-
sumers are aware of (or can anticipate) the producers pricing and product quality decisions in future
stages and this fact is known to the producer. Both future utilities and prices are discounted in the
calculation of present value of consumer surplus. The discount factor is assumed common to both
producer and consumers. The discount factor is also assumed common to utilities and prices in
this base model. In Section 5.2, we analyze a case where this assumption is relaxed. This assumes
that utilities are readily converted to dollar values. The analysis then proceeds by rst constructing
demand functions for the product based on product attributes and prices that are chosen by the
rm and on assumptions about customer heterogeneity and behavior. These functions are then
incorporated into an optimization program for each rm that generates best response prices. These
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best response prices are then solved for equilibrium prices.
Customer willingness to pay (WTP) for the product / service, denoted by , is uniformly distributed
over the interval [0,1]. For a customer of type , the function  U is the monetary value or utility
that the customer would ascribe to owning a product / service of quality U over an innite horizon.
This implies that a customer of type  would be willing to purchase a product / service if it
would provide surplus that is greater than the sales / rental price; i.e.  U  p > 0. A customer
selecting among multiple (and mutually exclusive) options will select the one that provides the
highest surplus. Let  be the discount factor. Consequently, the utility derived by a customer in
exactly one period of a innite horizon problem is (1  )  U .
3.1 Structure of the game
In a particular time period, we dene the state of the system to be the highest type customer who
has not bought the product prior to that period. Customers with a higher type are not active
participants in the market since they have already bought the product. From here on, we speak
only of strategies for those customers who are active in a given period (and their type is necessarily
less than the state of the system). A customers strategy is the nature of the contract (buy, rent,
do nothing) that he selects. The payo¤ to the customer resulting from this strategy is the surplus
corresponding to each contract. The objective of the customer is to pick a strategy that maximizes
this surplus. A demand curve can be constructed based on this choice.
A rms strategy is a vector of functions that maps the state of the system (dened on the interval
[0,1]) in each time period into a price (also dened on the interval [0,1]) for that period:
Strategyset S = ff1; f2; :::f1g : statespace ! pricespace
= ff1; f2; :::f1g : [0; 1]! [0; 1]
When the function in period t as a function of state t is of the form:
f(t) = t  t
where t is a constant between 0 and 12, the strategy is said to be linear. When the elements 1 to
2Restricting this constant between 0 and 1 ensures that customers who purchase in period t receive positive
surplus.
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1 are such that 1 = 2 = :::: = 1, this strategy is said to be stationary. We use the subgame
perfection equilibrium concept and all subgame equilibria are dened with respect to the rms for
given demand curves.
3.2 Duopoly Setting
Consider a symmetric duopoly: both rms sell a product of similar quality. Further, when each
of these rms o¤ers a subscription service, the loss in product quality is the same for both rms.
Consider a two stage game where rms choose a product architecture and hence the consequent
contracting strategy (sell or lease) in the rst stage and then compete in the market using prices in
the second stage. We rst observe the second stage outcome of this game assuming that rms have
made the choice of contracting strategies. This results in three possible outcomes: 1) both rms
sell their product 2) both rms o¤er a subscription service or 3) one rms sells its product while
the other rm o¤ers a subscription service. Note that from these three outcomes, only the third
outcome involves asymmetric strategies adopted by the rms. First, we observe that the rst two
outcomes involve Bertrand competition and each rms equilibrium price is zero3. Consequently,
we only describe the price equilibrium for the third asymmetric outcome.
Let period t represent a point in time such that t 1 periods have already elapsed. We rst describe
the consumersdecision problem. The value of the sellers product over the innite horizon is Us
and the similar value for the renter is Ur: The corresponding prices in period t are pst and prt. The
state of the system in period t is the highest type of customer who has not bought the product
at the beginning of period t and is denoted by t. From the denition of t as the highest type
customer who has not bought prior to period t, it follows immediately that t is weakly decreasing
as time elapses:
t  t+1  t+2  ::::: for every t
The value function of customer type in each period is the maximum surplus for the customer
starting from that period over the innite horizon. Hence, the value function V(t) for a customer
3The proof of this result is straightforward and available with the authors.
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of type  at state t can be stated as a recursive function as follows:
V(t) =Max
8>>><>>>:
Buy: Us   ps;t)
Rent: (1  )Ur   pr;t + V(t+1)
Do nothing: V(t+1)
9>>>=>>>; (1)
The rst line of equation (1) indicates that if the customer buys the product in period t, then the
customer exits the market and has no more choices to make in future periods. The second line
indicates that if the customer chooses the subscription option, then the customer is free to choose
any of the three options in the next period. The customer who chooses the "do nothing" option
in period t simply postpones the decision to the next period but with a discount factor applied to
utilities and prices. We set Us = 1 and Ur = r  1. Thus, r is the new perceived quality (after
quality loss due to the subscription model). A lower r indicates a greater perceived quality loss due
to subscription. Using the customer value function in equation (1) and the fact that Us  Ur, we
state a lemma characterizing the equilibrium states of the game:
Lemma 1 Given optimal pricing by both rms, t+1 is the threshold customer type that is indif-
ferent between buying in period t versus renting in the period t and buying in period t+ 1:
t+1 =
ps;t   pr;t   ps;t+1
(1  )(1  r)
The result in lemma 1 immediately leads to the calculation of the demand curve in each period. If
t is the highest customer type that has not bought the product in period t and t+1 is the highest
customer type that has not bought the product in period t + 1, then the demand in period t is
simply a summation of all customer types located between these thresholds. Given that customer
type  is uniformly distributed, it follows that this demand is equal to the di¤erence between the
two thresholds. Thus, the demand in each period for the seller (qs;t in period t for the seller) is
simply the di¤erence between successive states. Customers who do not buy in period t may rent
provided the one-period consumer surplus obtained by them through renting is positive. Given
that the single period utility through a subscription service is (1  ) r and the price paid is pr;t, a
customer  who does not buy will rent only when   (1  ) r  pr;t  0. Given that, in any period
t, only customer types below t+1 have not bought the product, we can once again invoke the
uniform distribution of customer type to calculate subscription / rental demand in period t. Thus,
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the demand in each period for the renter (qr;t in period t for the renter) depends on the successive
state and the per-period rental price o¤ered in period t. Both demand functions are stated below.
qs;t = t   t+1 (2)
qr;t = t+1   pr;t
(1  ) r (3)
Let s;t be the total discounted prot of the seller starting in period t over the innite horizon. Let
Vs(t) be the value function for the seller at state t. The Bellman equation for the seller is:
Vs(t) =Maxps;t (s;t = ps;t(t   t+1) + Vs(t+1)) (4)
and note that t+1 is a function of ps;t.
Similarly, let r;t be the total discounted prot of the rm o¤ering the subscription service starting
in period t over the innite horizon. Let Vr(t) be the value function for the renter at state t. The
Bellman equation for the renter is:
Vr(t) =Maxpr;t

r;t = pr;t

t+1   pr;t
(1  )r

+ Vr(t+1)

(5)
We look for an equilibrium by restricting attention to linear and stationary strategies4. Similar to
the monopoly model of selling versus renting in Tirole(1988), we dene the following functions:
ps;t = s  t (6)
pr;t = r  t (7)
t+1 = (ps;t   pr;t) (8)
where , r, and s are constants with 0 < r, s  1 and  > 0.
Proposition 1 Restricting attention to linear and stationary strategies, the best response functions
for the rm o¤ering a subscription service and the rm selling a product, r and s respectively,
are:
r =
(1  )rs
1   + s
s =
p
(1  )(1  r)2 + r(1  r)  (1  )(1  r)

4We restrict attention to linear strategies because the demand in each period is a linear function of prices. Sta-
tionary strategies are chosen because they are easy to implement if a stationary equilibrium indeed exists.
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with 0 < r  1; 0 < s  1. Given these response functions, there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof in the appendix
Given these response functions, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
Given the nature of the equilibrium pricing policy and a state t, the equilibrium prot in period
t for both the seller and the renter can be written out. This is accomplished by setting ps;t, pr;t
and t+1 in terms of equilibrium values es; 
e
r, and 
e using proposition 1. Dene the equilibrium
prots for the seller and renter in period t to be es;t and 
e
r;t. The expressions for the prots are:
es;t =

es(1  e(es   er))
1  e2(es   er)2

2t (9)
er;t =

er
(1  )r

(1  )re(es   er)  er
1  e2(es   er)2

2t (10)
4 Numerical Results
The previous section analyzes the equilibrium outcomes of duopoly price competition between dif-
ferentiated products over an innite horizon. However, the equilibrium prices and the state of the
system are not available in closed form. As a result, we can analyze the comparative statics at equi-
librium only numerically. Figure 1 charts the states of the system across time at equilibrium prices
for r = 0:5. The state of the system is exponentially decreasing and asymptotically approaches
zero.
Figure 2 does the same for equilibrium prices and reveals similar results. However, the sellers
price is always higher than the renters price since the seller o¤ers a higher value product over a
longer time horizon. In gure 3, we chart the prot of both rms in the duopoly as the level of
di¤erentiation decreases (r increases).
In the seller-renter duopoly, consumers postpone their commitment to a high value seller by renting
a lower value product from a renter for a limited number of time periods. They eventually switch
to the seller but at a substantially lower price. However, this does not answer the question as to
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how the level of di¤erentiation (the parameter r) a¤ects individual rm prot. Through gure 3,
we capture the e¤ects of di¤erentiation on rm prots (we x  = 0:5 for this purpose). At low
values of r (high di¤erentiation), the subscription service incorporates little value in its product
and hence makes low prots. As the value of r increases (di¤erentiation decreases), the value of the
subscription service increases and hence prot increases. However, as the di¤erentiation continues
to decrease (r increases), the e¤ects of price competition take over and both rms experience a
signicant decline in prots. This implies that there is an optimal level of di¤erentiation for the
subscription service. Since the two rms are symmetric and di¤erentiation is caused primarily by
loss in quality of the subscription service, this implies that there is some sort of "optimal loss"
for the subscription service. This result is similar in spirit to the di¤erentiated price competition
result in Moorthy(1988). This provides guidance on making investments in enhancing quality for
the subscription service. It might be worth making such investments only if the loss level brings
quality below the optimal point of di¤erentiation. When the loss level is low and the e¤ective
service quality is above the optimal point of di¤erentiation, the rm providing the subscription
service might make further e¤orts to reduce service quality by perhaps disabling some features of
the original product.
We also seek to analyze the change in rm prots as a function of discount factor . At  = 0,
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both settings are alike with no regard for future time periods. As the discount factor increases, the
seller is hit by the time inconsistency problem and in the duopoly, this also a¤ects the competing
renter. Hence the prot for each rm in the duopoly involving a seller and a renter decreases with
an increase in the discount factor and approaches zero at  = 1. This illustrates the generalization
of the Coase conjecture from a monopoly to a duopoly setting involving competition between a
higher value seller and a lower value renter.
5 Extensions to the base model
In this section, we discuss the impact of relaxing some of the assumptions underlying the base
model from the previous sections. In particular, we examine two extensions: rst, we examine the
case of rms that are asymmetric in their base quality o¤ering; second, we analyze a case where
the discount rate used for product quality and producer / consumer surplus are di¤erent.
5.1 Asymmetric rms
Suppose that the two rms vary in the quality of the base product. The rm that o¤ers a product
of higher quality is labelled H while the other rm is labelled L: We normalize the high quality
product to 1 and denote the quality of the low end product by 4 < 1. Further, we assume that the
perceived quality loss when the product is o¤ered as a subscription service is the same in percentage
terms for both rms. As in the base model, o¤ering a subscription service requires us to adjust the
quality of the base product (for both rms) by a multiplicative factor r. However, since the rms
are di¤erentiated ex-ante, the exact level of di¤erentiation will vary from the base model depending
on the exact product / subscription service strategy. We denote di¤erent strategy combinations as
follows: (X;Y ) denotes a strategy combination where the rm with a higher base product quality
o¤ers X while the rm with lower base product quality o¤ers Y . In our model, S denotes a product
selling strategy and R denotes a subscription service or rental strategy. As is commonly observed in
practice, we will restrict attention to the equilibrium where the rm with higher base quality adopts
a product selling strategy and the rm with lower base quality o¤ers a subscription service. Prot
for a rm at equilibrium prices given a particular product / subscription strategy combination
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(X;Y ) is denoted by T (X;Y ) where T represents rm type (whether H or L). With the notation
in place, we are in a position to write the conditions required for an equilibrium where rm H
adopts a product selling strategy while rm L adopts a subscription service strategy.
H (S;R)  H (R;R)
L (S;R)  L (S; S)
The conditions listed above ensure that neither rm has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from its
strategy in the (S;R) combination. The prot function for each rm at equilibrium depends on the
level of di¤erentiation. In the (S;R) combination, the level of di¤erentiation is 1  r  4 whereas it
is   (1 4) in the (R;R) combination and 1 4 in the (S; S) combination. For asymmetric rms,
4 < 1 and hence H (R;R) and L (S; S) are both strictly positive. This is unlike the symmetric
rm case where both are equal to zero. Similarly, a lower 4 implies higher di¤erentiation in the
(S;R) combination thereby increasing H (S;R) but this may either increase or decrease L (S;R).
Consequently, it is unclear based on di¤erentiation alone whether an (S;R) equilibrium is more or
less likely. However, tracking the movement of equilibrium prot with respect to  provides greater
insight. In the symmetric rm case, we know that (S;R) is an equilibrium for all values of  < 1
and provides equal (= zero) prot with respect to (R;R) and (S; S) at  = 1. For asymmetric
rms, we know that prots of both rms under (S;R) equals zero at  = 1 (the analysis is the same
as in the base model except that the lower quality product is adjusted by a factor 4). However,
(R;R) provides positive prots5 at  = 1. This implies that (S;R) is not an equilibrium at  = 1
for 4 < 1. It can be shown that there exists a  2 [0; 1) such that (S;R) is an equilibrium only
for  < . The exact value of  depends on r and 46 with  = 1 at 4 = 1. Thus, when the
asymmetric rm case is compared with the symmetric case, the region over  where (S;R) is an
equilibrium decreases as rm asymmetry increases.
5.2 Di¤erent discount factor for quality and producer / consumer surplus
In many contexts, product or service quality and monetary values may be discounted di¤erently.
In the base model, we assigned a common discount factor  to both quality and monetary values.
In this subsection, we relax this assumption with respect to the base model. We assume that in
5An analysis of this case is straightforward and is available with the authors.
6The exact analysis is available from the authors.
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any period t, current period utility for a customer is calculated from lifetime value of the product
using a discount factor d < 1 and future period surplus is discounted using the same discount factor
as before, . Since we are using  as the discount factor for monetary values, we apply the same
discount factor to producer prot in future periods. This alters the the expression for the state of
the system as compared to that stated in Lemma 1:
t+1 =
ps;t   pr;t   ps;t+1
(1  )  (1  d) (1  r)
This leads to a change in the best response functions for both rms as compared to those stated in
Proposition 1. The new expressions are:
r =
1
2

(1  d)  r  s
1   (1  s)

s =
p
(1  ) (1  r    + d  r) [1  (1  d) r    (1  r)]  (1  )2 + r (1  d) (1  )
(1  ) 
Setting d =  in the above best response functions gives us the same equations as in Proposition
1. In addition, the above best response functions have the same properties for any d < 1 as the
corresponding ones in the base model and lead to a unique stationary equilibrium in pure linear
strategies. While the exact values of the equilibrium states of the system and the prices may change
when d 6= , the basic insights remain the same. Thus, the insights from our base model are robust
to di¤erences in discount rate between product / service quality and producer / consumer surplus.
6 Discussion
The notion of o¤ering online subscription services has become very common in the information
goods industry. In some industries such as software services, this is merely a rebirth of a model
that was widely prevalent during the era of mainframes. Many information goods can be classied
as durable goods, and this leads one to conclude that the ability to o¤er subscription services can
only be good for the rm. This conclusion follows from a basic application of the Coase conjecture.
However, an often observed fact with online subscription services is the loss in quality due to issues
with data security and network reliability. The objective of our work was to understand how this
loss in quality combined with competition might a¤ect our original intuition.
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To examine this closely, we build an innite horizon competitive model. When two symmetric rms
compete in the market, quality loss may o¤er an avenue for di¤erentiation. This occurs particularly
when one rm decides to sell while the other decides to rent. This di¤erentiation benets both rms
but ensures higher prots for the rm that sells as compared to the rm that rents, since the rm
that o¤ers a subscription has lower quality. However, if the loss in service quality is too high for
the subscription rm, it might lead to much lower prots. For instance, when quality deteriorates
to zero, the rm no longer makes a prot as customers can derive no value from the subscription
service. Thus, a rm that chooses to o¤er a subscription service in the presence of a competitor
that sells its product must be aware of an optimal level of quality loss that maximizes its prot.
This acts as a guide towards making investments in improving quality. If quality loss is not high,
there may not be much value in making such investments as they are only likely to hurt the rm
by minimizing di¤erentiation in the context of competition. On the other hand, if the loss level is
high, then such investments would bring the rm closer to an optimal level of di¤erentiation. We
also discuss the robustness of these results to other settings, particularly the case of asymmetric
rms and a case where the discount factor used for product / service quality is di¤erent from the
discount factor used for producer / consumer surplus. We nd that the main insights remain the
same although the specic values of equilibrium prices may change.
Going back to the base model, one question to ask would be: since the subscription service makes
lower prot than the product seller, which of the two symmetric rms would occupy the position
of the subscription service? A possible answer is that the rst mover might occupy a sellers
position while a late entrant would o¤er the subscription service. Our model of competition only
addresses the outcome of competition in a market over a snapshot in time where such decisions
have already occurred in the past. Future work might consider evaluating the outcome of such rm
entry dynamics.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 From the denition of t as the highest type customer who has not bought
prior to period t, it follows immediately that t is weakly decreasing as time elapses:
t  t+1  t+2  ::::: for every t
Next, we show that in every period, for given renters prices, there exists a threshold that splits
the market into two segments: one segment of customer types higher than the threshold that has
bought the product prior to the period, and a segment of customer types lower than the threshold
that has not bought the product. This is shown by contradiction. Suppose the threshold does not
exist. Then there exist customers 1 and 2 such that 1 < 2 and in some time period, customer
of type 1 has already bought the product and 2 has not. This contradicts the fact that V(t) that
is monotonically increasing in 7. Hence the threshold must exist. Since this threshold exists, and
using the denition of the state of the system, this threshold in period t must be t. Furthermore,
this implies that if t = t+1 for some t, the seller experiences zero demand in period t. At optimal
pricing, at each period t, given the renters prices, the seller will never experience zero demand.
This is again shown by contradiction. Assume that the seller experiences zero demand in period
t. Now suppose that the seller applies a new price in period t: pnews;t   pr;t = ps;t+1   pr;t+1. This
ensures that some of the original demand in period t + 1 occurs in period t without a¤ecting the
demand (and hence prot) from period t+ 2 onwards.
qnews;t + q
new
s;t+1 = q
old
s;t+1
qnews;v = q
old
s;v for all v > t+ 1
where qolds;t and q
new
s;t represent the demands in period t for the seller before and after the change in
prices.
Since the original prices have the rm earning zero revenue at time t, the new price sequence would
give the rm strictly higher discounted prots. In other words, under optimal pricing, no period
experiences zero demand for the seller, which further implies:
t > t+1 > t+2 > :::: for every t
7Proof of the fact that V(t) that is monotonically increasing in  is straightforward and is available with the
authors.
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Given the existence of the threshold that splits the market into customers who have already bought
and those who have not, all  2 (t+1; t) buys in period t and all  2 (t+2; t+1) buys in period
t   1. Setting Us = 1 and Ur = r < 1 in equation (1), the value function for the customer, a
similar argument for the renter shows that all  2

1
1 

pr;t
r ; t+1

rent the product in period t
and this segment is never zero at optimal renters prices. So t+1 is the indi¤erence point between
two market segments: buying in period t versus renting in period t and buying in period t  1. We
express this condition using equation (1):
t+1   ps;t = t+1 (1  ) r   pr;t +  (t+1   ps;t+1)
which simplies to:
t+1 =

1
(1  )(1  r)

(ps;t   pr;t   ps;t 1) (11)
as required.
Proof of Proposition 1 We substitute for the state of the system in period t+1 using equation
(8) in the value functions of the two rms given by equations (4) and (5):
Vs(t) =Maxps;t (s;t = ps;t(t   (ps;t   pr;t)) + Vs((ps;t   pr;t))) (12)
Vr(t) =Maxpr;t

r;t = pr;t

(ps;t   pr;t)  pr;t
(1  )r

+ Vr((ps;t   pr;t))

(13)
Addressing the sellers problem rst, the prot from period t onwards over the innite horizon
(denoted by s;t) is:
s;t = ps;t(t   (ps;t   pr;t)) + Vs((ps;t   pr;t)) (14)
For any given renters price pr;t, di¤erentiate the prot function with respect to ps;t to give:
@s;t
@ps;t
= t + pr;t   2ps;t + V 0s ((ps;t   pr;t)) (15)
@2s;t
@p2s;t
=  2+ 2V 00s ((ps;t   pr;t)) (16)
Di¤erentiating equation (12) with respect to t and invoking the envelope theorem:
V 0s (t) = ps;t (17)
Using the linearity of ps;t as a function of t from equation (6) and substituting in equation (17):
V 0s (t) = st (18)
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and
V 00s (t) = s (19)
Using equations (18) and (19) in equations (15) and (16) respectively.
@s;t
@ps;t
= t + pr;t   2ps;t + 2s(ps;t   pr;t) (20)
@2s;t
@p2s;t
=  2+ 2s (21)
Using equations (6) and (8) in the indi¤erence equation from lemma 1 to get the identity:
 =
1
(1  )(1  r) + s (22)
which on rearrangement gives:
s = 1  (1  )(1  r) (23)
Using equation (23) in equations (20) and (21), setting the rst derivative to zero and further
simplication:
s =
p
(1  )(1  r)2 + r(1  r)  (1  )(1  r)

(24)
@2s;t
@p2s;t
=  (1 + (1  )(1  r)) (25)
Equation (25) shows the concavity of the prot function in ps;t for price as a linear, stationary
function. Equation (24) is the rst order condition that provides the best response price for the
seller.
We shift attention to the renters problem. The prot from period t onwards over the innite
horizon (denoted by r;t) is:
r;t = pr;t

(ps;t   pr;t)  pr;t
(1  )r

+ Vr((ps;t   pr;t)) (26)
Knowing the structure of Vr, it is clear that Vr((ps;t pr;t)) is not a function of pr;t. Consequently,
taking derivatives in equation (26):
@r;t
@pr;t
= ps;t   2pr;t   2pr;t
(1  )r (27)
@2r;t
@p2r;t
=  2  2
(1  )r < 0
3
The negative second derivative guarantees concavity and setting the rst derivative in equation
(27) to zero thus provides the best response renters price:
r =
1
2

(1  )rs
1   + s

Rearranging this equation:
s =
2(1  )r
(1  )r   2r
(28)
Di¤erentiating equation (28) with respect to r :
ds
dr
=
2(1  )2r
((1  )r   2r)2
and
d2s
d2r
=
8(1  )2r
((1  )r   2r)3
(29)
Using equation (28), the second derivative can be rewritten as:
d2s
d2r
=
r
(1  ) 

s
r
2
> 0
Thus, by inspection, s is a strictly convex increasing function of r :
For the seller:
s =
p
(1  )(1  r)2 + r(1  r)  (1  )(1  r)

(30)
Evaluating the slope of the best response function:
ds
dr
=
1  r
2
p
(1  )(1  r)2 + r(1  r)
(31)
and
d2s
d2r
=   (1  r)
2
4 ((1  )(1  r)2 + r(1  r))
3
2
By inspection, s is a strictly concave increasing function of r.
Next, we state a lemma (proof available from the authors) that aids in proving uniqueness of
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If f (strictly convex) and g (strictly concave) are increasing functions and for m;n 2 R
(n > m):
f(m) < g(n) and f(n) > g(m)
Then f and g intersect exactly once in the interval (m, n)
4
Using equations (28) and (30), set f and g as follows:
f(r) =
2(1  )r
(1  )r   2r
g(r) =
p
(1  )(1  r)2 + r(1  r)  (1  )(1  r)

Also, set m = 0 and n = (1 )r2 , and this gives:
f(0) = 0 <
p
1  

1 p1  


(1  r) = g(0)
f

(1  )r
2

= 1 >
q
(1  )(1  r)2 + (1 )r(1 r)2   (1  )(1  r)

= g

(1  )r
2

Using the lemma, f and g have a unique intersection and this provides a unique equilibrium in
pure strategies that are linear and stationary.
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